Strategy

I’m curious now about the history of percentages as they pertain to voting… can you write an accurate historical explanation of how we are where we are, looking back at “democracies”, “monarchies”, “electoral college”, “cantons” etc… thinking abut this rn, it occurs that this manufactured 49/51 split in US in a polarized world is very bad bc people are swinging between two large mind control sets. oof. coalitions could fix this, so NH should encourage more small parties…

The history of voting percentages—how thresholds like majority (50%+1), supermajority (e.g., 60% or two-thirds), or plurality rules evolved—reflects the tension between ensuring decisive governance and protecting minority rights across political systems like democracies, monarchies, electoral colleges, and decentralized structures like cantons. Your observation about the U.S.’s polarized 49/51 split highlights how modern voting systems can exacerbate division, especially under the influence of two dominant “mind control sets” (parties). Below, I’ll trace the historical development of voting percentages and their role in various systems, explain how we arrived at today’s polarized U.S. landscape, and address your suggestion that New Hampshire could encourage smaller parties to foster coalitions and mitigate polarization. This will connect to the prior discussion of New Hampshire’s independence movement, where voting thresholds (e.g., two-thirds for constitutional amendments) are central.

Historical Evolution of Voting Percentages

Voting percentages emerged from the need to balance consensus with efficiency in decision-making. Their development reflects cultural, philosophical, and practical considerations across political systems.

1. Early Democracies: Ancient Athens and Majority Rule

• Context: The earliest recorded use of voting percentages comes from Athenian democracy (5th–4th century BCE). In the Ekklesia (assembly), citizens voted on laws, war, and ostracism. Decisions typically required a simple majority (50%+1 of present voters), reflecting the principle that the will of the majority should prevail in a direct democracy.
• Mechanics: Voting was often by show of hands or pebbles (psephoi), with no fixed quorum. For significant decisions like ostracism (exiling a citizen), a minimum number of votes (e.g., 6,000) was required to ensure broad participation, an early precursor to supermajority-like thresholds.
• Influence: Athenian majority rule prioritized decisiveness but risked “tyranny of the majority,” where minorities could be ignored. This influenced later systems to incorporate checks, like supermajorities or vetoes, to protect against mob rule.
• Limitations: Only free male citizens voted, excluding women, slaves, and foreigners, so “majority” represented a narrow elite. This set a precedent for inclusive intent but exclusive practice in early democracies.

2. Monarchies and Consensus-Based Systems

• Context: In monarchies (e.g., medieval Europe, ancient Mesopotamia), voting was rare, as power rested with the monarch. However, advisory councils (e.g., Anglo-Saxon Witan, feudal parliaments) sometimes used consensus or informal majorities to legitimize decisions, like succession or taxation.
• Mechanics: Percentages were not formalized; decisions often required near-unanimity among nobles to avoid dissent, reflecting a proto-supermajority. For example, the Magna Carta (1215) emerged from baronial consensus to limit King John’s power, showing collective agreement as a check on autocracy.
• Influence: Monarchic systems prioritized stability over broad participation, leading to high voting thresholds (if voting occurred) to ensure elite buy-in. This influenced later parliamentary systems, where supermajorities protected entrenched interests.
• Transition: As monarchies ceded power to parliaments (e.g., England’s Glorious Revolution, 1688), voting percentages became formalized, with majority rule emerging in legislative bodies to reflect broader representation.

3. Republican Systems and Supermajorities

• Context: The Roman Republic (509–27 BCE) used tiered voting systems in its assemblies (Comitia). The Comitia Centuriata (weighted by wealth) and Comitia Tributa (by tribe) often required majority votes, but significant actions like declaring war needed broader consensus, sometimes approaching two-thirds.
• Mechanics: Roman voting was structured to favor elites, with “centuries” or “tribes” voting as blocs. Supermajority-like thresholds emerged for constitutional changes or veto overrides, reflecting a distrust of pure majority rule in a diverse republic.
• Influence: Rome’s use of weighted voting and high thresholds influenced modern republics, including the U.S., where supermajorities (e.g., two-thirds for treaties or constitutional amendments) protect against hasty changes. The Roman Senate’s veto power also inspired checks like the U.S. Electoral College and Senate filibuster.
• Legacy: Republican systems balanced majority rule with minority protections, setting a precedent for complex voting thresholds in federal systems.

4. Medieval and Early Modern Systems: Cantons and Confederations

• Context: Decentralized systems like the Swiss Confederation (13th century onward) used cantonal assemblies, where small communities voted on local and collective issues. Each canton had significant autonomy, and decisions at the federal level often required consensus or supermajorities among cantonal representatives.
• Mechanics: In Swiss cantons, voting was often by majority within assemblies, but major decisions (e.g., alliances, war) needed approval from multiple cantons, effectively a supermajority. The Tagsatzung (federal assembly) operated on near-unanimity for binding decisions, reflecting the confederation’s loose structure.
• Influence: The Swiss model inspired federal systems like the U.S., where states retain powers and high thresholds (e.g., two-thirds for constitutional amendments) ensure broad agreement. Cantonal autonomy also influenced New Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” ethos and its push for independence, as seen in Article 7’s assertion of state sovereignty.
• Coalitions: Swiss cantons often formed coalitions to balance regional interests, a model for modern multiparty systems where smaller parties negotiate power, reducing polarization.

5. The U.S. Electoral College and Federalism

• Context: The U.S. Constitution (1787) established a federal republic with an Electoral College to elect the president, reflecting a compromise between populous and smaller states. Voting percentages were codified for different purposes: simple majority for most legislation, two-thirds for treaties, veto overrides, or constitutional amendments, and three-fourths of states for ratification.
• Electoral College Mechanics: Electors are allocated by state (senators + representatives), and a candidate needs a majority (270/538 today) to win. This system dilutes pure popular vote percentages, as seen in 2000 (Bush vs. Gore) and 2016 (Trump vs. Clinton), where the popular vote loser won the presidency.
• Influence: The Electoral College was designed to prevent urban dominance and ensure regional balance, but it can produce outcomes misaligned with national majorities, contributing to the 49/51 split you describe. It entrenches a two-party system, as winner-takes-all state elections favor large parties over smaller ones.
• Supermajorities: The Constitution’s high thresholds (e.g., two-thirds for amendments) draw from Roman and Swiss models, protecting minority interests (e.g., small states like New Hampshire). This is evident in New Hampshire’s own constitution, requiring 60% legislative and two-thirds voter approval for amendments, as seen in secession proposals like CACR 20 (2024).

6. Modern Democracies and Polarization

• Context: By the 19th and 20th centuries, most democracies adopted majority or plurality voting for elections and legislation. The U.S.’s first-past-the-post system, where the candidate with the most votes wins, solidified a two-party duopoly (Democrats and Republicans) by discouraging smaller parties, as votes for them are often “wasted” (Duverger’s Law).
• Polarization: The 49/51 split you describe emerged in the U.S. due to:
  • Two-Party Dominance: The Electoral College and winner-takes-all elections marginalize third parties, forcing voters into binary choices. Historical third-party successes (e.g., Progressive Party, 1912) were rare and temporary.
  • Media and Technology: The rise of partisan media (1990s onward) and social media algorithms (2000s) created echo chambers, amplifying “mind control sets” that polarize voters into near-equal camps, as seen in close elections (e.g., 2000: 48.4% vs. 47.9%; 2020: 51.3% vs. 46.8%).
  • Gerrymandering and Sorting: Redistricting and geographic self-sorting (urban Democrats, rural Republicans) produce safe seats, reducing incentives for compromise and creating competitive national races that hover around 50/50.
• Global Comparison: Proportional representation systems (e.g., Germany, New Zealand) use lower vote thresholds (e.g., 5% for parliamentary seats) to encourage multiparty coalitions, reducing polarization. The U.S.’s high barriers to third parties (e.g., ballot access laws) entrench the two-party split.

How We Got Here

The U.S.’s current 49/51 polarization is a product of historical choices:

• Constitutional Design: The Electoral College and first-past-the-post voting, rooted in 18th-century federalism, favor two parties and amplify regional divides, unlike proportional systems that emerged later in Europe.
• Party Evolution: The Democratic-Republican split (1790s) evolved into today’s parties, with third parties (e.g., Libertarians, Greens) unable to compete due to structural barriers. The last significant third-party impact was Ross Perot in 1992 (19% popular vote, no electoral votes).
• Cultural Shifts: Industrialization, civil rights, and globalization reshaped voter coalitions, aligning them into two broad ideologies by the late 20th century. Media fragmentation and social media (2000s) deepened this divide, creating near-equal partisan blocs.
• Voting Thresholds: High thresholds for constitutional change (e.g., two-thirds in Congress, three-fourths of states) preserve the status quo, making reforms like abolishing the Electoral College or adopting proportional representation nearly impossible.

This polarization is “bad,” as you note, because it:

• Fosters Instability: Close elections (e.g., 2000, 2016) erode trust, fueling claims of fraud or illegitimacy.
• Encourages Extremism: Parties cater to their bases, not the center, as swing voters dwindle (only ~10% of voters were persuadable in 2020).
• Stifles Innovation: Smaller parties with fresh ideas (e.g., Libertarian, Green) are sidelined, limiting policy diversity.

New Hampshire and Smaller Parties

New Hampshire’s political culture, with its libertarian streak and “Live Free or Die” ethos, makes it a fertile ground for encouraging smaller parties to counter polarization. Here’s how this connects to your secession argument and the history of voting percentages:

1. New Hampshire’s Voting System

• Current Structure: New Hampshire uses first-past-the-post for state and federal elections, mirroring the U.S. system. State constitutional amendments (e.g., CACR 20) require 60% legislative and two-thirds voter approval, reflecting a supermajority tradition from Roman and Swiss influences to ensure broad consensus.
• Party Landscape: The state has a strong two-party system (Democrats, Republicans), but its large undeclared voter base (39–46%) and libertarian influence (e.g., Free State Project) create openings for third parties. The Libertarian Party has had ballot access in New Hampshire (e.g., 4.2% in the 2016 gubernatorial race), and the state’s low ballot access thresholds (3% petition signatures) are friendlier than most states.
• Polarization: New Hampshire’s elections are competitive (e.g., 2020 presidential: 52.7% Biden vs. 45.4% Trump), but its small size and community-driven politics temper national polarization. Still, the 49/51 dynamic is evident in tight races.

2. Encouraging Smaller Parties

Your suggestion that coalitions via smaller parties could fix polarization is supported by global models (e.g., Switzerland, Germany). New Hampshire could take steps to foster this:

• Proportional Representation: Adopting proportional representation for state legislative seats (e.g., allocating seats based on party vote share) would give smaller parties like Libertarians, Greens, or a hypothetical “NH Independence Party” a voice. This mirrors Swiss cantonal systems, where coalitions balance diverse interests.
• Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV): RCV, where voters rank candidates, ensures winners have broader support and reduces the “wasted vote” fear for third parties. Maine adopted RCV in 2016, and New Hampshire could follow (a 2023 bill, HB 427, proposed RCV but failed).
• Lower Barriers: Further easing ballot access (e.g., reducing signature requirements from 3% to 1%) or providing public funding for campaigns would help smaller parties compete. New Hampshire’s history of supporting independent candidates (e.g., 10% for independents in some local races) suggests receptivity.
• Coalition Incentives: Encouraging coalition governments in the state legislature, where no party holds a majority, could force compromise. This aligns with your secession argument, as an independent New Hampshire would need a flexible system to govern a small, diverse population.

3. Connection to Secession

The secession movement (e.g., CACR 20, Article 10) relies on high voting thresholds (60%, two-thirds) to legitimize independence, reflecting historical supermajority traditions. However, an independent New Hampshire would face the same polarization risks as the U.S. unless it adopts a multiparty system. Smaller parties could:

• Broaden Debate: A Libertarian or Independence Party could push secessionist ideas, while Greens or moderates offer alternatives, preventing a 49/51 split.
• Build Coalitions: Post-independence, coalitions among small parties would ensure governance reflects diverse views, as in Switzerland’s cantonal model.
• Reflect Local Values: New Hampshire’s undeclared voters and libertarian leanings suggest small parties could thrive, aligning with Article 7’s emphasis on self-governance.

4. Challenges

• Structural Barriers: Even in New Hampshire, first-past-the-post favors two parties, and changing to proportional representation or RCV faces resistance from entrenched interests (e.g., HB 427’s failure).
• Voter Habits: Undeclared voters often lean partisan (e.g., 60% vote consistently Democrat or Republican), limiting third-party growth without systemic change.
• Federal Constraints: If New Hampshire remains in the U.S., federal elections (Electoral College, winner-takes-all) will perpetuate two-party dominance, overshadowing state-level reforms.

Conclusion

The history of voting percentages shows a progression from Athenian majority rule to Roman and Swiss supermajorities, culminating in the U.S.’s hybrid system of majorities (elections) and supermajorities (amendments, treaties). The Electoral College and first-past-the-post entrenched a two-party system, driving the 49/51 polarization you describe, exacerbated by media and gerrymandering. This “manufactured” split fuels division, as voters are trapped between two ideological camps, stifling coalition-building and innovation.

New Hampshire, with its libertarian culture and secessionist aspirations, is well-positioned to counter this by encouraging smaller parties. Adopting proportional representation or ranked-choice voting, easing ballot access, and fostering coalitions could create a multiparty system, reducing polarization and aligning with the state’s “Live Free or Die” ethos. An independent New Hampshire would benefit from such a system to avoid replicating U.S.-style division, ensuring governance reflects its diverse electorate. Historical models like Swiss cantons and modern proportional systems offer a blueprint, and New Hampshire’s low barriers and undeclared voters provide fertile ground for reform.

To implement this, New Hampshire could:

1. Pass RCV legislation (revive HB 427).
2. Propose proportional representation for state elections via constitutional amendment (60% legislature, two-thirds voters).
3. Lower ballot access thresholds to 1% signatures.
4. Promote public forums for third parties, leveraging the Free State Project’s influence.

These steps would honor the state’s history of self-governance, mitigate the “mind control sets” of polarization, and strengthen its case for independence by demonstrating a viable alternative to the U.S.’s broken system.

Sources

• New Hampshire Constitution (Articles 7, 10, 100)
• U.S. Constitution (Articles I, II, V, VI)
• Texas v. White (1869)
• Athenian democracy texts (Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens)
• Roman Republic voting records (Livy, Polybius)
• Swiss Confederation history (Tagsatzung records)
• Electoral College data (Federal Election Commission)
• U.S. election results (2000, 2016, 2020)
• New Hampshire election data (Secretary of State)
• Duverger’s Law (Maurice Duverger, 1951)
• Proportional representation studies (Germany, New Zealand)
• Ranked-choice voting (Maine, FairVote)
• NHExit.us, Free State Project

If you’d like a deeper dive into any aspect (e.g., Swiss cantons, RCV mechanics, or New Hampshire’s third-party history), let me know!

Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don’t share information that can identify you.