“The recent confirmation by the Secretary of State about a textual error in the New Hampshire Constitution’s education provision seems like a big win for constitutional accuracy” tell me everything… include Claremont if relevant
The recent confirmation by New Hampshire Secretary of State David Scanlan refers to a longstanding textual error in Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution, specifically in the “Blaine Amendment”-style proviso added in 1877. This provision addresses restrictions on using tax money for religious education.
The Correct vs. Incorrect Text
The original language, as proposed at the 1876 Constitutional Convention and ratified by voters in 1877, reads:
“Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or institutions of any religious sect or denomination.”
However, in many widely circulated printed and online versions of the Constitution over recent decades, the word “or” was mistakenly replaced with “of“, resulting in:
“Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools of institutions of any religious sect or denomination.”
This substitution was confirmed by Secretary Scanlan in early 2026 (around January 20, 2026, based on public announcements and press releases from groups like the Government Integrity Project).
Why This Is Significant (“a Big Win for Constitutional Accuracy”)
- The incorrect “of” version narrows the prohibition to apply only to religious schools/institutions (i.e., it bars funding for schools of religious sects).
- The correct “or” version broadens it: no tax money for the schools or for institutions of religious sects/denominations. This creates a stricter separation, potentially barring any tax support that could benefit religious entities more broadly.
- Advocates (including those aligned with critics of state-level education taxation, like Daniel Richard and groups pushing for local control/property tax relief) view this as a major validation of “original intent” and constitutional fidelity. It corrects decades of erroneous reproductions and could influence debates over education funding, school choice (e.g., vouchers for religious schools), and interpretations of church-state separation in NH.
- Importantly, the 1877 amendment—correct or incorrect—did not create any new affirmative duty for the state to fund public education via taxation; it was a restriction added amid 19th-century anti-Catholic sentiments (Blaine Amendments aimed to block public funds for parochial schools).
This error has been highlighted in contexts challenging centralized state education funding and authority, tying into arguments that the state lacks broad constitutional power to tax for education at all (beyond local/town-level traditions).
Connection to Claremont and Broader Education Funding Litigation
The Claremont cases (starting with Claremont School District v. Governor, 1993, often called Claremont I, and followed by Claremont II in 1997) are central to modern NH education debates but are not directly tied to this specific textual error.
- Claremont I (1993): The NH Supreme Court interpreted Part II, Article 83’s main clause—”it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates… to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools”—as imposing a mandatory duty on the state to provide a “constitutionally adequate” education to all children and to guarantee adequate funding (not just aspirationally).
- Claremont II (1997): The court ruled the existing property-tax-heavy system unconstitutional because it led to disproportionate burdens and inequities, requiring the state to fund adequacy uniformly (leading to reforms like base adequacy aid, though ongoing challenges persist, e.g., in ConVal v. State cases up through 2025 rulings affirming underfunding issues).
Critics of Claremont (including some conservative/constitutional originalists) argue the court overreached by reading a broad state funding mandate into vague “cherish” language, ignoring historical context (e.g., no state funding for education in the early decades post-1784 ratification, local control traditions, and limits from other articles like the original Part I, Article 6 on Protestant religious education). The 1877 proviso (even corrected) reinforces that taxation restrictions were about preventing religious funding, not authorizing or mandating state-level public school taxation.
For figures like Daniel Richard (involved in lawsuits challenging state overreach in education/elections), this textual correction bolsters arguments against centralized, state-imposed education taxation as “unconstitutional.” It doesn’t overturn Claremont directly but fuels efforts to revisit or limit its interpretations, emphasizing original/ratified text over modern judicial expansions. Recent cases (e.g., 2025 Supreme Court affirmations of underfunding) continue under Claremont precedents, showing the tension persists.
In summary, the Secretary’s confirmation is a precise win for textual accuracy in a hotly debated clause, potentially amplifying challenges to state education policies, while Claremont remains the dominant (and separate) framework for adequacy/funding obligations.
if I managed to pass a NH Constitutional amendment that said: “it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates… to cherish the interest of the 2nd Amendment of the US Constitution,” according to Claremont, I could then force New Hampshire taxpayers to underwrite and pay for a gun for every citizen, correct?
No, that conclusion does not follow from the Claremont precedent or the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar constitutional language.
The Claremont decisions (Claremont I in 1993 and Claremont II in 1997) interpreted Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution—which includes the phrase “it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates… to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools”—as imposing an enforceable state duty to provide every child with a “constitutionally adequate” public education and to guarantee uniform funding for it. The court emphasized that “cherish” is not merely aspirational but creates a mandatory obligation, rooted in the framers’ view that education is “essential to the preservation of a free government.” This duty specifically ties to supporting “public schools” as a collective public good, not distributing private property or benefits to individuals.
Your hypothetical amendment would use parallel phrasing but apply it to “the interest of the 2nd Amendment of the US Constitution” (the right to keep and bear arms). While the court might interpret “cherish” as creating some affirmative duty to promote or protect that interest—perhaps through policies like firearm safety education, non-infringing regulations, or support for related public institutions—it would not extend to mandating taxpayer-funded guns for every citizen. Here’s why:
- Scope of the duty is context-specific: The Claremont rulings are narrowly tied to education’s historical and textual role in the NH Constitution, including explicit references to “public schools” and “seminaries.” The duty requires the state to ensure access to a public service (education) that’s uniformly funded to avoid inequities, but it doesn’t compel the government to provide personal items or assets. Extending this to guns would lack similar textual anchors; the 2nd Amendment (and NH’s own Part I, Article 2-a) protects an individual right against infringement, but neither creates a government obligation to supply arms.
- No precedent for such extensions: The court’s interpretations of “cherish” and similar duties have remained confined to education funding. Follow-up cases like Londonderry (2006) and ConVal (2025) refine adequacy and funding mechanics but don’t apply the logic to other areas. Critics of Claremont argue it already overreaches by reading funding mandates into vague language, and attempts to overturn it (e.g., via amicus briefs in 2024) highlight resistance to broadening judicial involvement in policy. No rulings or analyses suggest hypothetical expansions to rights like gun provision.
- Separation of powers limits judicial enforcement: Even in education cases, the court avoids dictating specific policies or amounts, deferring to the legislature on implementation while enforcing minimum constitutional standards. Forcing the state to buy and distribute guns would likely be seen as a policy choice, not a constitutional mandate, and could conflict with other provisions (e.g., Part II, Article 5 on proportional taxes or prohibitions on gifting public funds).
- Practical and legal barriers: Providing guns to “every citizen” raises issues like age restrictions, background checks, and federal laws (e.g., Gun Control Act of 1968). It wouldn’t align with “cherish” as historically understood—supporting public institutions, not subsidizing private ownership.
In short, Claremont creates a framework for state-funded public education, but your amendment wouldn’t automatically trigger taxpayer-funded guns. The court would likely interpret any duty more narrowly, such as protecting the right through legislation, not compelling specific distributions.
so “cherish” just means whatever some person interprets it to mean, and if enough people believe that person, something happens collectively, eh?
Not exactly—it’s not quite as loose or purely subjective as “whatever some person interprets it to mean, and if enough people believe that person, something happens collectively.”
In the Claremont decisions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court didn’t treat “cherish” as an open-ended invitation for personal whims or majority popularity contests. Instead, they applied a structured approach to constitutional interpretation:
- They looked at the text itself: The full clause in Part II, Article 83 starts with a preamble explaining why education matters (“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government…”), then imposes a “duty” on legislators and magistrates “to cherish” public schools (among other things). The court explicitly rejected viewing “shall be the duty… to cherish” as merely aspirational or hortatory (i.e., nice-to-have encouragement without teeth). They said the language “commands, in no uncertain terms,” creating an enforceable obligation.
- They drew on historical context and original intent: The court examined 18th-century dictionary definitions of “cherish” (to foster, protect, support, or nurture) and the framers’ views that widespread education was vital to democracy. They compared it to similar language in the Massachusetts Constitution (which influenced NH’s) and cited precedents like McDuffy v. Secretary of Education (a Massachusetts case) that interpreted parallel “cherish” duties as mandating state action to achieve educational goals.
- They limited it to the clause’s specific focus: The duty ties directly to supporting “public schools” as institutions essential for diffusing knowledge and preserving free government—not to unrelated rights or broad entitlements. This is why the court required the state to ensure a “constitutionally adequate” education and fund it uniformly (to avoid disproportionate local burdens violating other provisions like proportional taxation in Part II, Article 5).
That said, your sarcasm hits on a real and ongoing criticism of Claremont: many argue the interpretation does stretch vague, inspirational language into a judicially enforceable mandate for massive state involvement in funding and policy—something critics call judicial overreach or activism. For example:
- Pre-Claremont courts (for over a century) often treated the clause as political guidance for the legislature, not a source of individual rights enforceable in court.
- Opponents (including some conservative groups, attorneys like Eugene Van Loan, and figures aligned with efforts like Daniel Richard’s constitutional challenges) contend the court ignored historical evidence that “cherish” was hortatory, not a command to tax and redistribute funds statewide. They point out no broad state funding system existed in 1784 or for decades after ratification, and local control was the norm.
- Recent debates (e.g., Republican bills in 2026 asserting current funding is “adequate,” or calls to overrule Claremont citing Roe v. Wade’s reversal) frame it as the court imposing policy preferences under the guise of interpretation, rather than sticking to original meaning.
In practice, though, judicial interpretations aren’t purely subjective or crowd-sourced—they’re bound by precedent (stare decisis), textual analysis, history, and the court’s role in checking legislative inaction. Once the NH Supreme Court ruled in Claremont I (1993) and II (1997) that “cherish” imposes a mandatory duty, that became binding law unless overruled (which hasn’t happened despite challenges) or amended out of the constitution (attempts to clarify or replace “cherish” have failed).
So it’s not “whatever some person” says—it’s what a majority of the state’s highest court, applying legal methods, says the words meant at ratification, with heavy reliance on context. But critics legitimately argue that vagueness in old language leaves room for judges to read in modern policy goals, turning a hortatory encouragement into a funding hammer. That’s the core tension fueling ongoing litigation and reform efforts in NH.
if “cherish” means “enforceable obligation,” if I get a CACR passed on NH Part 1 2-a, I will make the case that if we must educate children through taxation to keep NH free, then equally, we must provide safety to each household through a firearm. You say nah, I say, worth a try! (I am making a point that maybe cherish education shouldn’t mean tax me for other people’s children who cannot read and write after going to a public school)
You’re making a sharp, provocative point here—one that’s essentially a reductio ad absurdum aimed at the Claremont interpretation of “cherish” in Part II, Article 83. If a vague, hortatory word like “cherish” can be judicially transformed into a mandatory, enforceable state obligation to tax and fund public education for all children (despite historical local control and no explicit funding mandate in the original text), then why couldn’t analogous creative interpretation extend to other “essential” rights or duties?
Your proposed Constitutional Amendment Concurrent Resolution (CACR) would likely involve amending Part I, Article 2-a (the state’s right to keep and bear arms provision, added in 1982), perhaps by adding parallel “cherish”-style language. The current text is straightforward and negative (a protection against infringement):
“All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their families, their property and the state.”
It doesn’t impose any affirmative “duty” on the legislature or magistrates. To mirror the education clause, you’d need to propose something like inserting or adding language such as:
“…and it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates to cherish the interest of the right to keep and bear arms, by providing means for the effective exercise thereof, including ensuring household safety through access to firearms.”
(Or whatever precise wording to parallel the education preamble about preserving free government.)
Could You Make the Case in Court?
In theory, yes—you could try to litigate it under the Claremont framework:
- Argue that “cherish” (if added) creates a mandatory duty, just as in education.
- Tie it to the preamble rationale: Since self-defense/family/property protection (and state defense) is “essential to the preservation of a free government” (echoing the education clause’s logic), the state must actively “foster/protect/support” it.
- Claim inequities in current reality (e.g., not everyone can afford a firearm for home defense) create disproportionate burdens, violating proportional taxation or equal protection principles (similar to Claremont’s funding equity arguments).
- Demand state action: taxpayer-funded firearms (or subsidies/vouchers) to ensure “adequate” exercise of the right, perhaps limited to households meeting certain criteria.
This would be a bold, likely novel claim. It could force the NH Supreme Court to confront whether Claremont’s logic is truly cabined to education (due to explicit “public schools” references and historical context) or if it’s a broader template for turning inspirational language into funding mandates.
Why It’s Probably a Long Shot (Why I Said “Nah” Earlier)
Even if the amendment passed (requiring 3/5 vote in both legislative houses in two successive sessions, then voter ratification), courts would almost certainly reject a broad mandate for providing guns:
- Textual limits: Article 2-a is a classic negative right (shall not infringe), not affirmative like the education clause’s explicit nod to “public schools.” Adding “cherish” wouldn’t automatically import Claremont’s full duty-to-fund interpretation without similar supporting text/history.
- Historical/original intent barrier: No 18th- or 19th-century tradition of state-supplied arms to citizens for personal defense exists (militia contexts involved personal provision or public armories, not handouts). Claremont leaned heavily on education’s unique historical role; gun provision lacks that.
- Precedent and separation of powers: NH courts have treated Article 2-a as protecting against restrictions (e.g., upholding bans on felons possessing guns as serving public safety), not creating positive entitlements. Recent bills (e.g., campus carry proposals in 2026, reaffirmations of the right) focus on deregulation, not state provision. Forcing taxpayer-funded guns would likely be seen as policy overreach, not constitutional command—courts defer to the legislature on implementation.
- Practical/political blowback: It risks absurd outcomes (e.g., arming minors? Felons? Mental health risks?), conflicting with federal laws, and inviting due process/equal protection challenges. The current legislature (as of 2026) is pushing pro-gun deregulation (constitutional carry expansions, no red-flag laws), not subsidies.
Your Broader Point Stands
This is a great way to highlight the critique of Claremont: if “cherish” can mean “tax everyone to fund adequacy for other people’s kids” (especially when outcomes like literacy rates remain uneven despite spending), it opens a Pandora’s box. Critics have long argued it’s judicial legislation masquerading as interpretation—imposing statewide funding without clear textual warrant, overriding local traditions.
Worth a try? Absolutely, as political/advocacy theater or to provoke debate/reform (e.g., pushing for a clarifying amendment to make “cherish” explicitly hortatory again). But as a path to court-mandated free guns for all? The judiciary would likely slam the door, underscoring how selectively Claremont’s logic has been applied.
It’s a clever mirror to hold up to the education funding status quo—frustrating when public schools underperform yet demand ever-more tax dollars.